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THE DILEMMA OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT IN EGYPT 
QUESTIONS OF GENDER EQUALITY, ELIMINATION OF POLITICAL 
OPPOSITION AND UNDERPRIVILEGED CITIZENS 
 
Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The judicial appointment process involves several legal, political, and social aspects.1 Incon-
sistency between these aspects can lead to discrimination and inequality, eating away at the 
core of the judicial system.2 Both the legal and political aspects of judicial appointment have 
a great impact on society.3 This is manifested in discrimination against political opponents, 
underprivileged citizens, and women. In terms of gender inequality in judicial appointments 
in Egypt, presently only 68 out of 15,000 judges are female,4 indicating a clear lack of fe-
male representation in all three supreme courts (the Court of Cassation, the State Council, 
and the Supreme Constitutional Court).5 Equally, underprivileged and political minorities 
rarely have an equal chance in the appointment process.6 This paper argues that a balance 
must be sought between judicial qualifications and judicial appointment powers in order to 
eliminate any discrimination in the appointment process.7 In summary, the ideal situation in 
judicial appointment involves striking a balance between appointment qualifications and rel-
evant appointment powers in order to remove any form of discrimination in the appointment 
process. 
 
The judicial appointment process covers two aspects: judicial legitimacy and judicial qualifi-
cation.8 Judicial legitimacy refers to the source of the judicial authority. In the republic sys-
tem, although the judge rules in the name of the people,9 defining the actual role of the peo-
ple can be challenging.10 It may take on a direct form of legitimacy, in that the judge is di-
rectly elected, or it can take on an indirect form, in which the judge is appointed by an elect-
ed authority: either the president 11 or both the president and Parliament (Congress). 12 In 
                                                 
1 See generally Peter Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is there one “Best” Method? 23 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1995), http://ir.law.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1455&context=lr.    
2 Theresa Beiner, The Con Law Professor with Judicial Appointment Power, 14 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 6 
(2013); see 
Daniel Nadler, An Opportune Moment: The Judicial Appointment Reforms and the Judicial Credentials De-
manded by 
the Charter, 15 CONST F. 131 (2006).  
3 See generally David Williams, The Judicial Appointment Process, 2004 N.Z.L. REV. 49 (2004).  
4  Dalia G., Egypt swears in 26 new female judges, EGYPT STREET, (July 17, 2005), 
https://egyptianstreets.com/2015/06/ 17/egypt-swears-in-26-new-female-judges/. 
5 See generally Mahmoud Hamed, Egypt: The Lingering Battle for Female Judgeship, 23 in GENDER AND THE 
JUDICIARY IN AFRICA FROM OBSCURITY TO PARITY? (Gretchen Bauer & Josephine Dawuni ed., 2016).  
6 See generally Lobna Monieb, Egyptian law graduates denounce class based job discrimination, AHRAM 
ONLINE, (Oct. 20, 2014), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/113461/Egypt/0/Egyptian-law-
graduates-denounce-classbased-jobdis.aspx; see Sarah Moawad, Egypt’s Poor Revolution, MUFTAH, (Oct. 24, 
2014), https://muftah.org/egypts-poor-revolution/#.WdIr0GhSzIU.  
7 See generally Dominc O’Sullivan, Gender and Judicial Appointment, 19 U. QUEENSLAND L. J. 107 (1996); 
See also Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial Appointment: A Re-
Examination, 21 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 297 (2009).  
8 Id.  
9 Law No. 89 of 1986 (Regarding the organization of Certain Cases of Public Invitations for General 
Subscription), 1 ARAB L. Q. 579, 1986, (Egypt). 
10 See generally Thomas Cooley, The Fundamentals of American Liberty, 3 MICH L. J. 149, 149-151 (1894).  
11 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 71 (Egypt). 
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Egypt, Article 20 of the 1973 Judicial Authority Law (JAL) states that “judgments are issued 
in the name of the people.”13 The definition of the people, however, was left out. There were 
no clear definitions of the people during successive republican eras. The socialist/communist 
system of former President Gamel Nasser defined the people as only one category of people 
––those who were members of the Socialist Union.14 Under former presidents Anwar Sadat 
and Hosni Mubarak, the concept of the people became even more vague than during Nasser’s 
era.15 Instead of fixing the concept of the people to reflect a democratic form of government, 
they maintained their authority over the judicial appointment process.16 The Egyptian Consti-
tution of 2014 grants the judiciary full independence in the appointment process.17 The judi-
ciary is the competent authority for appointing judges. Even though such an act ensures, in 
the judges’ view, independence of the appointment process, such process lacks any form of 
checks and balances between the judiciary, executive, and legislative branches. As a result, 
the definition of the people –– who are the purported source of judicial legitimacy –– remains 
unclear. It also raises the question as to who the judiciary is accountable to if they are consid-
ered their own source of legitimacy.   
 
Judicial qualification starts once a candidate enters law school.18 Any law student is a poten-
tial candidate for a judicial career. Holding a law degree is, in most world jurisdictions, the 
first requirement towards a judicial appointment. A judge in a district court is a potential 
judge for one of the courts of appeal, and, similarly, a judge in one of courts of appeal is a 
potential candidate for the Supreme Court.19 The judicial appointment process reaches its 
peak when the candidate holds a position in the Supreme Court.20Judicial qualification co-
vers three aspects: general judicial requirements, judicial education requirements, and judi-
cial training requirements.  General judicial requirements concern the nationality of the 
judge.21 Education requirements can vary across states, with some preferring more than a law 
degree.22 There are only three countries that require nothing but a law degree to become a 
judge: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Egypt.23 Many states, such as Germany, 
                                                                                                                                                       
12 John Tunney, Judicial Appointment process, 34 PEPP L. REV. 275, 275-277 (2006-2007), see also, David 
Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
479, 482 (2005). 
13 Former laws, which were also during the republic period, the article used the word “nation” instead of the 
“people”. The using of the word nation reflected the regime understanding to the Arab Nation. Is also reflected 
the union between Egypt, Syria and Yemen during that time. See Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), 
al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 20 (Egypt). 
14 See generally Peter Mansfield, Nasser and Nasserism, 28 INT’L J. 675 (1973). 
15 AMR SHALAKANY, IZDIHĀR WA-INHIYĀR AL-NUKHBA AL-QĀNŪNIYYA AL-MIṢRIYYA 1805-2005, 277 (Dar 
Al-Shorouk, 2013). 
16 Id. 
17 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 100, 14 Jan. 2014, (stating that “Court decisions shall 
be issued and implemented in the name of the people.”).  
18 See generally Juan Mayoral, Urszula Jaremba, & Tobias Nowak, Creating EU law judges: the role of genera-
tional differences, legal education and judicial career paths in national judges’ assessment regarding EU law 
knowledge, 21 J. 
EUROPEAN PUB. POL. 1123 (2014). 
19Id. 
20 Id. 
21 The nationality requirement is not exclusive requirement in Egypt. It is a general requirement in most of the 
universal 
jurisdictions like the United States. See U.S. COURTS, Citizenship Requirements for Employment in the Judici-
ary, http://www.uscourts.gov/careers/search-judiciary-jobs/citizenship-requirements-employment-judiciary. 
22 See generally Lorne Sossin, Judicial Appointment Democratic Aspirations, and the Culture of Account-
ability, 58 U.N.B.L.J. 25 (2008). 
23 Id. 
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require a master’s degree in law as a prerequisite for judicial appointment.24 Judicial training 
requirements come in two forms. The first is that of pre-appointment training, while the sec-
ond concerns continuing education and training. Pre-appointment training is a common re-
quirement in France, Germany, and Egypt;25 other states, including the United States, do not 
require such training. 
 
The comparison between various jurisdictions serves several purposes.26 First, it highlights 
two conflicting aspects of judicial appointment: prioritizing either judicial appointment quali-
fications or judicial appointment powers.27 Second, the comparison aims to form the legal 
basis for the proposed solution, which is outlined in the last section of this paper.28 This pa-
per addresses a pressing challenge in Egyptian society dealing with discrimination against 
women, political minorities, and underprivileged people.29   
 
The comparison is limited to the practices of four countries and the applicability of these 
practices to the Egyptian case. These countries are the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany. Practices of these four jurisdictions fall under three general approach-
es. The first approach places more importance on the competent authority over judicial ap-
pointment qualifications (the US Example).30 The second approach places less weight on the 
competent authority, while attaching more importance to judicial appointment qualifications 
(French Example).31 The last approach balances judicial appointment requirements and judi-
cial appointment powers (German Example).32 
 
The founders of modern Egypt adopted the French legal system in the early 1880s.33 The 
German legal system is the next closest to the French and Egyptian systems.34 Egypt adopted 
the French legal system while it was still a British colony.35 However, the British system in-
directly influences the practices of the Egyptian legal system.36 The US legal system is based 
                                                 
24 See generally Barbara Hamilton, Criteria for Judicial Appointment and Merit, 15 QUEENSLAND U. TECH. L. 
J. 12 (1999). 
25 See Luis Muniz-Arguelles & Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and Training of Judges in Spain, France, 
West Germany and England, 8 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9-15 (1985).  
26 See generally David Clark, Comparative Law Methods in the United States, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
135 (2011); see Thera Dieleman & Lotte Meurkens, Jaakko Husa: A New Introduction to Comparative Law, 22 
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 640 (2015); see also Edward J. Eberie, Method and Role of Comparative 
Law, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 475 (2009). 
27 See generally Terence Lau, Judicial Independence: A Call for Reform, 9 NEV. L. J. 79 (2008); see W.H. Hu-
riburt, Appointment of Judges, 6 ALTA. L. REV. 175 (1968); see also, Timothy Youdan, Powers of Appointment, 
27 EST. TR. & PENSIONS J. 268 (2008). 
28 See generally Max Rheinstein, Teaching Comparative law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (1938); see Pierre Legrand, 
Negative Comparative Law, 10 J. COMP. L. 435 (2015). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 See generally Geoffrey Samuel, Comparative law and Jurisprudence, 47 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 825 (1998).  
32 Id.  
33 Bryon D. Cannon, A Reassessment of Judicial Reform in Egypt, 1876-1891, 5 INT’L J. AFR. HISTORICAL 
STUD. 51, 55 
(1972). 
34 See Luis Munis-Arguelles & Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and Training of Judges in Spain, France, 
West Germany and England, 8 B.C. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 1, 37 (1985).  
35 See generally Mary Daly, What Every Lawyer Needs to Know About the Civil Law System, PROF. LAW SYMP. 
ISSUES 38 (1998). 
36 See generally Fernando Orrantia, Conceptual Differences between the Civil Law System and the Common 
Law System, 19 SW. U. L.REV. 1161(1990). 
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on the principles of separation of power and checks and balances.37 Thus, in addition to 
French and English influences, there is the influence of the US legal system with regard to 
the method of appointment.38 Despite these influences, the Egyptian legal system still lacks 
some of these principles. The purpose of this paper is to present the variations and differ-
ences within various legal jurisdictions. 
 
This paper is divided into four main sections. The first section presents the judicial formula-
tion of the Egyptian judiciary, which includes judicial administration and judicial organiza-
tion. The second is a case study on Egyptian judicial appointment methods. It includes two 
key aspects related to judicial qualification requirements and judicial appointment powers. 
This part illustrates the difference between de facto and de jure in the judicial appointment 
system in Egypt. These differences pave the road to a deeper understanding of legal and po-
litical aspects of discrimination within the appointment process. The third section discusses 
contemporary challenges in judicial appointment. These challenges can be summarized as 
gender inequality, elimination of political minorities, and underprivileged citizens. The 
fourth section proposes a solution for problems identified in this paper.   
 
II. JUDICIAL FORMULATION OF THE EGYPTIAN JUDICIARY 
 
A. Judicial administration: 
  
A) The first body is the Supreme Constitutional Court (hereinafter SCC).39 It is the compe-
tent judicial body with ultimate power over constitutional disputes. However, litigants cannot 
resort directly to the SCC. They must first get the approval of the regular or administrative 
courts to resort to the SCC.  
 
The establishment of the SCC underwent two phases during Sadat’s era. The first was the 
legal articulation of the basis of the SCC, while the second involved the establishment of the 
Court. The actual process of establishing the SCC, however, started after the first Egyptian 
constitution was ratified in 1923.  
 
The first time the Egyptian courts recognized the unconstitutionality claim was in 1926. 40 
The courts did not declare the unconstitutionality of the law; rather they maintained their 
right not to apply the law. Banning Egyptian courts from handling the constitutionality of the 
laws is based on many reasons. First, even though the Egyptian civil legal system is based on 
the French system, the application of the laws turned into a monocracy. This was a system 
that excluded the King’s acts, which include the constitutionality of the law, from the judicial 
                                                 
37 See generally Peter Quint, Implications of the President’s Appointment Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 87 (2013); see 
William Smith, Reflections on Judicial Merit Selection, the Rhode Island Experience, and Some Modest Pro-
posals for Reform and 
Improvement, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 668 (2010); see also Geoffrey NcNutt, Formal and Functional 
Approaches to Separation of Powers: The Political Cost of Checks and Balances in Nixon v. United States and 
Morrison 
v. Olson, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301(1995). 
38 See generally Rachel Brand, Judicial Appointment: Checks and Balances in Practice, 33 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 55 (2010); see Cheryl Saunders, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Branch, 11 JUD. REV. 
337 (2006); see also Harold Laski, Technique of Judicial Appointment, 31 Com. L. League J. 447 (1926).   
39 See generally Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the State: the Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 886 (2003).  
40 Ahmed Abdel Fattah, Mostafa Mohi & Moetaz Nadi, Al-Mahkamah Al-Dostoryah Al-a’lya: Tarikh 
men-al-Qada we-al-Syasyah, Al-Masry Al-Youm (July 30, 2013), 
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/151535. 
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authority. Second, there was a lack of a legal foundation –– which would have been more 
realistic –– for such authority from 1883 to 1971. There was no legal foundation to grant 
courts the right to deal with the constitutionality of law.41  
 
The first time the  unconstitutionality of the laws was legalized was in 1953. This took place 
right after the 1952 coup.42 This legal endeavor had initially failed because members of the 
army refused any judicial supervision.43 The second legal attempt took place after the 1971 
Constitution. This constitution included five new articles, numbered 174 to 178 that regulate 
the formulation of a specialized constitutional court. First, the 1971 Constitution stated that 
the SCC is an independent judicial body.44 Second, it addressed the tackling of constitutional 
questions.  
 
There is also the time gap between the first articulation of the SCC and the SCC Law. It took 
eight years (from 1971 to 1979) to establish the court. One of the reasons for this was the fear 
of an independent judiciary that would deal with the constitutionality of the law.45 Further-
more, there was a need, after the shift to a market-based economy in Egypt, for the SCC to 
oversee the legality of the laws. There was a need to ensure the rule of law in the country to 
attract foreign investment.46  
 
The SCC is an independent judicial body.47 The 2014 Constitution ensures the independence 
of its seat, budget, and general assembly. The SCC consists of three main bodies. The first is 
the chief justice of the Court, who is the head of the Court. The chief justice has many other 
constitutional responsibilities, including the impeachment of justices.48 In the case of both 
the absence of a president, and/or the disseverment of parliament, the chief justice takes 
charge of the country until a new president has been nominated.49 The current chief justice of 
the SCC, Adly Mansour, replaced President Mohamed Morsi as interim president after the 
military coup of July 2013.50 He ruled Egypt for nine months, until Field Marshall Abdel Fa-
tah al-Sisi won the presidential elections in March 2014.51  
 
The second body is the People’s Assembly, which is responsible for the administrative affairs 
of the court. The People’s Assembly is “responsible for governing the Court’s affairs and is 
consulted during law drafting of issues related to the Court’s affairs.”52 The People’s Assem-
bly also has additional functions. Article 144 of the Constitution states “[i]n case of the ab-
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.  
44 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 174, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that “The Supreme 
Constitutional Court shall be an independent judicial body with a distinct legal nature in the Arab Repub-
lic of Egypt, and shall have its seat in Cairo.”). 
45 See generally Tamir Moustafa, Law versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 883, 886 (2003). 
46 Id. at 889. 
47 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 191, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that “[t]he SCC is an inde-
pendent judicial body… [I]t has independent budget, the items of which are discussed by the House of Repre-
sentatives, after it is approved, it is incorporated in the state budget as a single figure.”).  
48 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 159, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that in case of impeach-
ment of the president, a special tribunal is formulated to prosecute Chief Justice of the SCC). 
49 Id. at art. 160. 
50  BBC NEWS, Profile: Interim Egyptian President Adly Mansour (July 4, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23176293.  
51 BBC NEWS, Egypt Abdel Fattah al-Sisi Profile, (May 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-19256730. 
52 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 191, 14. Jan. 2014.  
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sence of the House of Representatives, the oath is to be taken before the General Assembly 
of the SCC.”53 It is also the body that oversees the acceptance of the resignation of the presi-
dent in the event of the People’s Assembly being dissolved.54  
 
The third body is the Commissioner Authority, which consists of the judges, advisors, and 
assistant advisors.55 Members of the Commission are ranked as chancellors.56 Their role is to 
prepare the cases for the SCC judges. They have the right to contact any governmental or 
nongovernmental entities within the country to request information pertaining to certain cas-
es.57 The Commissioner Authority plays the role of the investigator in the case in order to 
produce a report or opinion to the SCC about the case in question.58 The report presents con-
stitutional and legal issues and offers its legal opinion.59  
 
The SCC has jurisdiction over certain types of cases. The Constitution lays down the general 
line of the jurisdiction of the SCC, while the SCC law lays down the details.60 In short, the 
SCC is responsible for overseeing the following issues: the judicial supervision of the consti-
tutionality of the law and regulations (Art. 25),61 the conflict of law and the conflict of juris-
diction among judicial institutions (Art. 25),62 the conflict raised as a result of contradictory 
judgments between two different judicial institutions (Art. 25),63 the interpretation of the 
laws and regulations (Art. 26),64 and the unification of the interpretation of the laws (Art. 
26).65 Figure (1) presents the entities of the SCC and their main functions: 
 
Figure (1): SCC formulation and administration  
 
                                                 
53 Id. at art. 144. 
54 Id. at art. 158. 
55 Id. at art. 193. 
56 Law No. 48 of 1979 (Supreme Constitutional Court), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 1979, art. 21 (Egypt). 
57 Id. art. 39. 
58 Id. art. 40. 
59 Id.  
60 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 192, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that the court is: exclusive-
ly competent to decide on the constitutionality of laws and regulations, interpret legislative texts, and adjudicate 
in disputes pertaining to the affairs of its members, in disputes between judicial bodies and entities that have 
judicial mandate, in disputes pertaining to the implementation of two final contradictory rulings, one of which is 
issued by any judicial body or an agency with judicial mandate and the other issued by another body, and in 
disputes pertaining to the implementation of its rulings and decisions).   
61 Law No. 48 of 1979 (Supreme Constitutional Court), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 1979, art. 25 (Egypt). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. art. 26.  
65 Id. 
Supreme Constitutional Court  
Chief  Justice of  the Court  Committee of Temporary  Issues 
Takes on the Public Assembly  Tasks during the Annual Vacation  of the Court (Art. 10)  
Responsible for  initiating the  preliminary  investigation against  the court members in  the impeachment  process (Art. 19)  
Public Assembly 
Tasks  
Case  assignment  ( Art. 8)  
Opinions  about  amendment  of the Court  regulations  8) Art.  ( 
Member s Vice  President s of the  Court 
President  of the  Court   Commissi on 
6
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol11/iss1/3
DEPAUL JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, VOL. 11, ISS. 1 [2018], ART. 3 7 
 B) The second body is the ordinary judiciary, which is the main judicial body. It is the com-
petent judiciary for all types of cases except two. First, administrative cases fall under the 
State Council jurisdiction.66Article 15 of the Judicial Authority Law (hereinafter JAL) states 
that                           “except administrative disputes, which the State Council is in charge of, 
courts are competent of every type of disputes and crimes.”67 Second, constitutional disputes 
fall under the jurisdiction of the SCC.68 Moreover, the ordinary judiciary consists of the Pub-
lic Prosecution Office (hereinafter PPO) and three different types of courts: the Court of Cas-
sation, the Court of Appeal, and the Court of First Instance (primary courts and partial 
courts).69 Figure (2) shows the hierarchy of the ordinary judiciary.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (2):  Hierarchy of the ordinary judiciary                                                                                                                                        
                                                  
                                                 
66 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 15 (Egypt). 
67 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 188, 14 Jan. 2014 (states that the judiciary adjudi-
cates all disputes and crimes except for matters over which another judicial body is competent. Only the judici-
ary settles any disputes relating to the affairs of its members, and its affairs are managed by a higher council 
whose structure and mandate are organized by law).  
68 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 192, 14 Jan. 2014. 
69 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 15 (Egypt). 
Supreme Constitutional Court  
Chief  Justice of  the Court  Committee of Temporary  Issues 
Takes on the Public Assembly  Tasks during the Annual Vacation  of the Court (Art. 10)  
Responsible for  initiating the  preliminary  investigation against  the court members in  the impeachment  process (Art. 19)  
Public Assembly 
Tasks  
Case  assignment  ( Art. 8)  
Opinions  about  amendment  of the Court  regulations  8) Art.  ( 
Member s Vice  President s of the  Court 
President  of the  Court   Commissi on 
  
Court of  Cassation (1 Court ) Court of  Appeal  (7 courts ) • Primary Court  (27 courts ) • Partial Court (in  every district in  the country) Court of First  Instance 
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The Court of Cassation is the highest court and the only one of its kind in the ordinary judici-
ary, as shown in Figure (2). It was established in 1931 and is located in Cairo.70 It consists of 
four bodies. The first is the Court of Cassation Public Assembly, which consists of all the 
members of the court, including those of the chief justice, associate justices, and junior jus-
tices. The work of the Court of Cassation is based on the principle of seniority. The most 
senior member takes charge of the court. The presidency term of the court is just one judicial 
year, which starts in October and concludes at the end of September the following year. The 
chief justice also serves as president of the Supreme Judicial Council (hereinafter SJC). The 
second entity is made up of the Criminal Law General Committee and the Civil Law General 
Committee.71 Each committee consists of 11 judges chosen by members of the People’s 
Assembly.72 The third body is the court circuits. There are a total of 33 circuits, of which 16 
deal with criminal cases and 17 with civil, commercial, family and labor cases.73 The fourth 
entity is the Court of Cassation Technical Office. This office specializes in the administrative 
affairs of the court.74 Figure (3) illustrates the formulation of the Court of Cassation.   
Figure (3): Formulation of the Court of Cassation 
 
 
 
The Court of Cassation is not a court of facts but rather a court of law. This means that par-
ties cannot bring new additions to their cases. The Court of Cassation only rules on whether 
the lower court of appeal has applied a correct understanding of the law.75 Additionally, the 
Court of Cassation is responsible for determining general legal rules that are followed in any 
given dispute. It offers a unified understanding of the law, which all lower courts must fol-
low. The process of developing these rules is restricted. It goes through three main stages. 
First, one of the 33 circuits has to establish a new rule or overrule an existing one. This cir-
cuit must then transfer its new rule to the competent general committee to determine the ap-
plicability of the new rule. Seven members of the competent committee must agree on the 
new rule to be able to proceed to the next step. Second, if the new or overruled ruling is ac-
cepted by seven members of the competent committee, the new rule is then transferred to the 
two general committees together for approval. A majority of 14 out of 22 judges must agree 
to consider a new legal rule.76 Third, a procedural rule must be followed by the technical of-
                                                 
70 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 2, 14 Jan. 2014.  
71 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 3 (Egypt). 
72 Id. at art. 4. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.at art. 5 (stating that it specializes in “supervision of the case row of the court, present similar and 
connected cases, or these cases that need single legal principle to execute a judgment.”). 
75  EGYPT JUSTICE, Court of Cassation: The Supreme Court of Egypt’s Common Court System, 
https://egyptjusti ce.com/court-of-cassation/. 
76 Id. 
Court of Cassation  
Court of  Cassation  Prosecution  Office  ( Article  24) 
Technical Office  ( Article  5) Public Assembly of the Court (Judges of  the Courts)  ( Article 4)   
Criminal Committee 
Misdemeanor  Circuits Felony  Circuits 
Civil, Commercial, Family  Committee 
Civil Circuits Commerical  Circuits Family  Circuits Labor  Circuits  
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fice of the court. This office is responsible for publishing the new rule to the general public. 
This process is summarized in Figure (4)77 
Figure (4): Establishing a legal rule by the Court of Cassation   
 
 
                                                 
77 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 5 (Egypt). 
  
Court of Cassation Public  Assembly Two General Committees  ( Criminal and Civil  Committees) 
Circuits (33  circuits)  (14  criminal and 17 civil ) 
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Egypt is also home to eight courts of appeal.78 These are located in Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta, 
Mansoura, Ismalia, Bani Swaif, Assiut and Qena governorates.79 Before the courts in Qena 
and Ismalia were introduced in 2006, there were only six courts. The circuits in the Court of 
Appeal consist of three judges.80 All of them have the rank of “Judge at the Court of Appeal.”  
 
The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. For civil law jurisdiction, 
it is restricted to appeal cases that are worth more than forty thousand (40,000) Egyptian 
pounds. These types of cases are under the jurisdiction of the primary court (in the court of 
first instance jurisdiction).81 As for the criminal law jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal is re-
sponsible for felony cases only. To this day, felony cases have no specialized appeal court. 
The current form of appeal for felonies is to resort to the Court of Cassation, which is a pro-
cess that takes place over various stages. In the first stage, the Court of Cassation, because it 
is a court of law, does not deal with the facts of the case. If it finds an incorrect legal interpre-
tation, it orders a retrial at a different circuit of felony courts. In the second stage, the defend-
ant has the right to appeal the second felony court’s judgment in front of the Court of Cassa-
tion. In the second appeal, the Court of Cassation either sustains the second felony court 
judgment or rules in the case by itself. In the latter case, the Court of Cassation acts as a court 
of equity. It will hear all witnesses, excluding new evidence, and all factual pleadings. As a 
result of this complicated process, many lawyers and politicians request a legal amendment 
to include an appeal level for felony courts. The 2014 Constitution includes an article that 
mandates an appellate court for felony judgments.82 To date, however, there is no regulation 
governing the appeal of felonies.   
 
As shown in Figure (2), the Court of First Instance is divided into two different courts, name-
ly the primary courts and the partial courts. First, the primary court is the upper court within 
the Court of First Instance. There is one primary court in each governorate.83 It consists of 
several circuits. Each is made up of three judges.84 In civil law cases, the primary court has 
unique value jurisdiction. It is considered a court of first instance for cases worth more than 
forty thousand (40,000) Egyptian pounds. However, it is considered a court of appeal for 
cases worth less than forty thousand (40,000) pounds.86 In criminal law matters, the primary 
court is considered an appeal court for misdemeanor cases. Second, the partial court is the 
lower court within the Court of First Instance, with one in every district in the governorate.87 
The partial court consists of one judge. It has jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters. For 
civil law jurisdiction, it has non-appealable jurisdiction over civil cases that are worth less 
than forty thousand (40,000) pounds. In cases worth less than forty thousand (40,000) pounds 
and more than five thousand (5,000) pounds, the partial court acts as a court of first in-
stance.88 As for criminal law jurisdiction, it is restricted to misdemeanor cases only, which 
are crimes that are punishable by a sentence of less than three years).89   
                                                 
78 Id.at art. 10.   
79 Id. at art. 6.   
80 Id.   
81 Id. at art. 4. 
82 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 96, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating “the law shall regulate the 
appeal of felony sentences”). 
83 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 9 (Egypt). 
84 Id.at art. 7. 
86 Act No. 81 of 1996 (To Amend Provisions of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, Law No. 13 of 
1968), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, vol. 19 bis, 22 May 1996, art. 42 (Egypt). 
87 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 13 (Egypt). 
88 Act No. 81 of 1996 (To Amend Provisions of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, Law No. 13 of 
1968), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, vol. 19 bis, 22 May 1996, art. 42 (Egypt). 
89 Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code), 5 Aug. 1937, art. 11 (Egypt). 
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The PPO is considered an integral part of the regular judiciary. Contrary to widespread un-
derstanding, the role of the prosecution is considered part of the executive authority.90 The 
Egyptian PPO, during the Republic Era, underwent three stages of developments that eventu-
ally led to giving prosecution a judicial characteristic, which is the status of the prosecution. 
In the first stage, the PPO was a member of the executive authority (1951-1952).91 Judges 
were responsible for investigations, while the public prosecutors’ work was limited to the 
prosecution of cases. In the second stage, the PPO enjoyed a mixed role, both executive and 
judicial, as a result of the Criminal Procedures Law amendment in 1952. This amendment 
gave the PPO the power and privileges of an investigative judge. Article 199 of the Criminal 
Procedures Law gave prosecutors the right to investigate any case. Even though the prosecu-
tion enjoyed the privileges of an investigative judge, the nature of the prosecution –– whether 
it was executive or judicial –– was still unclear. The Court of Cassation dealt with this ques-
tion in 1961. It emphasized the mixed nature of the public prosecution. The judicial nature of 
the prosecution consisted in it performing the role of an investigative judge, while its execu-
tive nature involved all the other tasks of the prosecution.92 In the third stage, the prosecution 
was considered a purely judicial authority. After a long debate over the nature of the prosecu-
tion, Article 189 of the 2014 Constitution considered the PPO members an integral part of the 
judiciary.93   
 
Part of the judicial nature of the PPO is the judicial nature of the position of the attorney gen-
eral, which is not yet reflected in the present JAL. Before 2014, the president had the ulti-
mate authority to appoint the attorney general.94 However, the 2014 Constitution transferred 
this authority over to the SJC.95 After the assassination of Attorney General Hesham Barakat 
in 2015,96 the appointment of a new attorney general was put on hold for more than six 
months.97 The reason for the delay was that the president wanted to appoint the new attorney 
general, while the SJC upheld its constitutional right to do so itself.98 Following this struggle, 
the SJC successfully appointed the new Nabil Sadek. As for the judicial oath, it must still be 
taken before the president.99 
                                                 
90 Stephanie Dangel, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 
YALE L. J. 1069, 1070 (1990); see also Saikrishna Prakash, Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 589 
(2005). 
91 Law No. 150 of 1950 (Criminal Procedures Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 15 Oct. 1951 (before 
amendment art. 63, 64 and 199) (Egypt). 
92 Mahkamat al-Naqd [Court of Cassation], case no. 1551, session of 9 Jan. 1961, year 30. 
93 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 189, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that the public prosecution 
is an integral part of the judiciary. It is responsible for investigating, law exempts pressing charges and prosecut-
ing all criminal cases except what. The law establishes the public prosecution’s other competencies).  
94 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, arts. 44 and 119 
(Egypt). 
95 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 189, 11 Jan. 2014 (stating  that “public prosecution is 
carried out by a Prosecutor General who is selected by the Supreme Judicial Council from among the Deputies 
to the President of the Court of Cassation, the Presidents of the Court of Appeals or the Assistant Prosecutor 
Generals, by virtue of a presidential decree for a period of four years, or for the period remaining until retire-
ment age, whichever comes first, and only once during a judge’s career”).  
96 BBC NEWS, Egypt Prosecutor Hisham Barakat Killed in Cairo attack, (June 29, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/w orld-middle-east-33308518. 
97 Mariam Jabal, Khlaf Dostori Yoajal Iktiar al-Na’b al-Am (“Constitutional Dispute Delaying the Selection of 
Attorney General”), ALBAWABA NEWS, Sept. 11, 2015, http://www.albawabhnews.com/1493128. 
98 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 189, 14 Jan. 2014. 
99 Nabil Sadek Sworn in by Sisi as Egypt’s New prosecutor general, AHRAM ONLINE, (Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://english.ah ram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/141872/Egypt/0/Nabil-Sadek-sworn-in-by-Sisi-as-Egypts-
newprosecu.aspx. 
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C) The third body is the administrative court, which is represented in the State Council. From 
1949 to 1984, administrative courts were part of the executive authority. Article 1 of the 
State Council Law stated that the State Council was an institute affiliated with the Ministry 
of Justice.100 After the 1952 military coup, the army issued a new law that made the State 
Council an independent body under cabinet supervision.101 In 1972, the new State Council 
law transferred the supervision from the cabinet back to the Ministry of Justice. In August 
1984, the law was amended to give the State Council full independence from the executive 
authority. The current formulation of Article 1 of the State Council law states: “The State 
Council is an independent judicial authority.”102 The 2014 Constitution and the State Council 
law thus give the administrative courts exclusive jurisdiction over administrative disputes.103 
 
The State Council consists of three different branches, as shown in Figure (5). These branch-
es are the judicial, legislative, and advisory bodies. The judicial branch has exclusive authori-
ty over administrative disputes. It consists of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Admin-
istrative Courts the Disciplinary Courts, and the State Commission Board.104 Additionally, 
the State Council Law excludes some administrative disputes, such as acts of sovereignty, 
from its jurisdiction 105 
 
The legislative branch is the competent authority for revising and passing any proposed law, 
regulation, or legal amendment that the government (either the president or the cabinet) 
wishes to issue. It prepares and submits any new legal text upon request by the govern-
ment.106 The president of the legislative branch is also the chief justice of the State Coun-
cil.107  
 
The advisory branch is the competent body for providing legal advice to the president, the 
cabinet, ministers and public institutions.108 Moreover, any governmental agency has to seek 
the acceptance of the advisory branch of the State Council in order to take on, accept, or val-
idate any contract, reconciliation, or arbitration award.109 To avoid any hassle from the gov-
ernment with the State Council advisory, the law gives the government the right to hire an 
advisory branch of the State Council to work as legal advisors to the president, the cabinet, 
ministers and public institutions.110 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 Law No. 9 of 1949 (Law of the State Council), al-Waqa’a al-masrayah. 1, Aug. 1949, art. 11 (Egypt).  
101 Law No. 165 of 1955 (Law of State Council), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 29 Mar. 1955, art.1 (Egypt).  
102 Law No. 47 of 1972 (Law of State Council), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 1 (Egypt). 
103 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 190, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that State Council 
“is exclusively competent to adjudicate in administrative disputes, disciplinary cases and appeals, and 
disputes pertaining to its decisions. It is solely competent to issue opinions on the legal issues of bodies to 
be determined by law. It reviews and drafts bills and resolutions of a legislative character, and reviews 
draft contracts, to which the state or any public entity is a party. Other competencies are to be determined 
by law). 
104 Law No. 47 of 1972 (Law of State Council), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 3 (Egypt). 
105 Id. at art. 11. 
106 Id. at art. 59/1. 
107 Id. at art. 70.  
108 Id. at art. 63. 
109 Id. at art. 58/3. 
110 Id. at art. 59/1. 
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Figure (5): 
Formulation of the State Council   
    
 
 
 D) 
 
    
(C) The Administrative Prosecution Office (hereinafter APO) was established in Sep-
tember 1954.  
 
The explanatory memorandum of the APO lists the reasons necessitating the establishment of 
the APO. First, the APO aims to face all forms of interference in the administrative investiga-
tion against senior public officials.111 Second, the APO is a replacement of several legal de-
partments that are established in each governmental agency or ministry. It is the sole body 
responsible for investigating violations by governmental officials. Third, the APO is respon-
sible for providing technical and legal training and education to its members. The agency en-
sures that all its members obtain the necessary and required training and education. Previous-
                                                 
111 Law No. 480 of 1954 (Administrative Prosecution Bureau Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 16 Sept. 
1954, art.1 (Egypt). 
State Council 
Judicial Branch 
Supreme  Adminstrative Court Administrative  Judicial Courts Administrative  Courts Disciplinary Courts  State Commission  Board 
Legislative Branch Advisory Branch 
State Council 
Judicial Branch 
Supreme  Administrative Court Administrative  Judicial Courts Administrative  Courts Disciplinary Courts  State Commission  Board 
Legislative Branch Advisory Branch 
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ly, each legal department was responsible for providing the required legal training to its 
members.112   
 
The development of the APO has undergone three stages. The first took place between the 
years 1954 and 1958, when the APO was still an affiliate body of the cabinet.113 The second 
stage unfolded from 1954 to 2014, a period during which the APO was under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Justice.114 In the third stage, from 2012 onwards, APO members started to 
lobby for their independence from the executive authority. They sought to eliminate any sort 
of interference by the Ministry of Justice.115 The APO finally achieved independence.116 It 
was also given exclusive authority over “financial and administrative irregularities. Regard-
ing these irregularities, it has the authorities vested in the administration body to inflict disci-
plinary penalties . . . . It also initiated and conducted proceedings and disciplinary appeals 
before the State Council courts in accordance with the law.”117 
 
B. Judicial organizations 
 
There are three forms of organizations in the judiciary: formal, semi-formal, and informal. 
The SJC is the only formal organization in the ordinary judiciary. The process of formulating 
the SJC underwent several stages before it reached its current status. The first stage occurred 
in 1943. The Independent Judiciary Law (hereinafter IJL) assigned the SJC to handle judicial 
issues such as judicial appointments, transfers, and public judicial issues.118 The SJC consists 
of eight members: the president of the Court of Cassation, the representative of the Ministry 
of Justice, the president of the Cairo Court of Appeal, the attorney general, an elected mem-
ber from the public assembly of the Court of Cassation, elected members from the public as-
sembly of the Cairo Court of Appeal, as well as the president of the Cairo Primary Court.119 
 
The second stage occurred after the amendment of the IJL in 1952, upon the success of the 
military coup.120 The amended Article 34 abolished any form of election in the formulation 
of SJC.121 The elected members were replaced with appointed members. Instead of electing 
two members –– one member from the public assembly of the Court of Cassation and one 
member from the public assembly of the Cairo Court of Appeal –– the two elected members 
were the president of the Alexandria Court of Appeal and the first vice president of the Court 
of Cassation.122 In 1956, a new amendment of the SJC was introduced to reflect the unifica-
tion between Egypt and Syria. The new SJC formulation doubled its membership to include 
both Egyptian and Syrian judges.123 After the dissolution of the union, a new law was issued 
in 1965. It returned the formulation of the council to its old form. This form continued to be 
in force until 1969. 
                                                 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Law No. 11 of 1989 (Administrative Prosecution Bureau and Disciplinary Courts Law), al-Jarīdah al-
Rasmīyah, 20 April 1989, art.1 (Egypt). 
115 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 197 § 1, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that the Administra-
tive Prosecution is an independent judicial body). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at art. 197 § 2. 
118 Law No. 66 of 1943 (Judicial Independence Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 12 July 1943, art.36 (Egypt). 
119 Id. at  art. 34. 
120 AMR SHALAKANY, IZDIHĀR WA-INHIYĀR AL-NUKHBA AL-QĀNŪNIYYA AL-MIṢRIYYA 1805-2005, 277 (Dar 
Al-Shorouk, 2013). 
121 Id.   
122 Law No. 66 of 1943 (Judicial Independence Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 12 July 1943, art. 36 (Egypt). 
123 Id. at art. 82.    
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The third stage occurred in 1969. President Nasser unified the SJC with the State Council 
board. This new Council was the Supreme Council for Judicial Institutes (hereinafter SCJI). 
The main role of the SCJI was to supervise both the ordinary and administrative judiciary. 
The aim of the new council was the cooperation between the judicial institutions, to advise 
judicial institutes, and to propose judicial legislation to reform the judiciary. The SCJI in-
cluded members from the ordinary judiciary, the State Council, the PPO, the APO and the 
State Case Authority. Even though the administrative judiciary was under cabinet supervi-
sion, the ordinary judiciary was an independent entity. As a result, this new formulation 
meant compromising judicial independence through the introduction of dependent institu-
tions to the independent judiciary.   
 
The last –– and current –– stage started in 2008. A new amendment was introduced to the 
JAL to replace the SCJI with the SJC. The current formulation of the SJC is similar to that 
after the 1952 coup. It consists of seven members who represent the various entities inside 
the regular judiciary. They are the president of the Court of Cassation, the first vice president 
of the Court of Cassation, the Cairo Court of Appeal president, the Alexandria Court of Ap-
peal president, the Mansoura Court of Appeal president (instead of the representative of the 
Ministry of Justice, as well as the attorney general.124  
 
The Judges’ Club (hereinafter Club), established in 1939, is the only semi-formal organiza-
tion within the judiciary. Its semi-formal nature is due to two reasons. First, there is no for-
mal judicial assignment or law that underpins the Club. Second, the Club includes all mem-
bers of the judiciary, both judges and prosecutors. Additionally, the Club’s nature is contro-
versial because it incorporates legal, social, and political aspects. In legal terms, the Club has 
no special law and is not mentioned in the JAL. The Club was established as a nongovern-
mental organization. It has its own bylaws, which were negotiated and set by judges and 
prosecutors. They include the rules of election to the Club board as well as administrative 
and financial issues. The Club’s major focus is its social aspect. The main club is located in 
Cairo, with several other clubs located in various governorates. The administration of these 
clubs is non-centralized, as each of them has its own board. Any judge or prosecutor can be a 
member of one or more of these clubs. As for its political role, the Club has, on numerous 
occasions, interfered in politics.125 This role, however, is exceptional. The JAL bans judges 
and courts from pursuing any form of political involvement.126 In the past decade, this type 
of interference has occurred twice.127 The first time was after the election fraud in 2005, 
while the second time was during the period of rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
In its contemporary history, the Egyptian judicial system identifies three informal organiza-
tions. They are the Secret Organization Tanziem Sarie al-Tali’I (hereinafter Tanziem), the 
Independent Judicial Movement Qoda’ al-Istqlal (hereinafter IJM), and the Judges for Egypt, 
known as Qoda’ men-ajl-Misr (hereinafter JFE). The informal nature of these organizations 
is also based on two reasons. First, they have no legal status, and, secondly, not all judges are 
members of such organizations.  
 
                                                 
124 Id. at art. 77.   
125 Atef Shahat Said, The Role of Judge’s Club in Enhancing the Independence of the Judiciary and Spurring 
Political 
Reform, 115 in JUDGES AND POLITICAL REFORM IN EGYPT (Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron ed., 2015). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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The first organization, Tanziem, was established during the period of President Nasser. It in-
cluded several judges who held leading positions within the Ministry of Justice and the PPO. 
For example, Judge Ali Nour Al-Din was appointed as the attorney general.128 Judge Sadak 
al-Mahdi was appointed as vice Minister of Justice.129 President Sadat dissolved the Tan-
ziem. Due to its secretive nature, there is a lack of official data regarding its current status.   
 
The second informal organization is the Judicial Independence Movement (JIM), which was 
established after the judicial massacre in 1969. From 1970 through to 2010, many judges 
formed the JIM. They organized secret meetings to support their goal of judicial reform. The 
leading figures of this movement were Hossam El Gheriani,130  Ahmed Mikky,131 and 
Hesham Genenia.132 They were, however, unable to enforce any judicial reform and black-
listed by the government. After the January 25 Revolution, many of the IJM members were 
appointed to high-ranking judicial and political positions, as a symbol of the political will to 
reform the judiciary.   
 
The third informal organization is the JFE. This organization was established after the Janu-
ary 25 Revolution. There are allegations that the JFE is connected to the MB. Waled Sharabi, 
one of the group’s leaders, was photographed leaving the MB headquarters. After ousting ex-
President Mohamed Morsi, Waled Sharabi was impeached. Additionally, the JFE condemned 
the 2013 military coup in a written statement. This statement was read out in public in Rab’a 
Square. As a result, members of the group were either impeached or are still awaiting im-
peachment proceedings.  
 
III. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT IN EGYPT 
 
A. Qualifications for Judicial Appointment 
 
The required judicial qualifications in Egypt are relatively few, compared with German or 
French requirements of judicial education.133 Even though the Egyptian legal system is great-
ly influenced by the French system,134 judicial requirements in Egypt are similar to those of 
                                                 
128 Ayman Gazi, Counselor Rifat al-Sayed: The Structure Helped Abdel Nasser in the Massacre of Judges, 
ROSALIEOUF DAILY, April 22, 2010, http://www.masress.com/rosadaily/58440. 
129 Id. 
130 Gheriani headed the Supreme Judicial Council from June 2011 to July 2012. He was appointed as the Presi-
dent of 
the Constitute Assembly in 2012. David Kipkpatrick, Egyptian Islamists Approve Draft Constitution Despite 
Objections, NY TIMES, November 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/world/middleeast/panel-
drafting-egypts-constitution-prepares-quick-vote.html.  
131 Sayed Gamaleddine, Egypt’s Justice Minister Ahmed Mekki Resigns: Judicial Source, AHRAM ONLINE, 
(April 21, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/69781/Egypt/Politics-BREAKING-Justice-
minister-Ahmed-Mekk 
i-resigns-Judi.aspx.  
132 Khaled Hassam, Egypt’s Former Top Auditor Says his Trial is Political, AL-MONITOR, (June 23, 2016), 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/egypt-corruption-hisham-geneina-sentence-interview.html. 
133 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 WM, & MARY BILL 
RTS J. 
7, 11 (2001); see also Harold Laski, The Technique Appointment, 24 MICH L. REV. 529, 524 (1926). 
134 Mohamed Abdelaal, Religious Constitutionalism in Egypt: A Case Study, 37 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 
43 (2013); see Ahmad Alshorbagy, On The Failure of a Legal Transplant: The Case of Egyptian Takeover Law, 
22 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 237, 239 (2012); see also Enid Hill, Comparative and Historical Study of Modern Middle East-
ern Law, 
26 AM. J. COMP. L. 278, 279 (1978). 
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the United States, and the United Kingdom.135 In the past, judicial education in Egypt was 
influenced by the British system of appointment. In the monarchic systems, the king had ab-
solute authority over the choice of judges.136 This is no longer the case in contemporary judi-
cial appointment requirements. Many educational requirements have been introduced without 
having a legislative mandate. The current form of judicial education requirements is based on 
three major aspects: judicial education, pre-appointment judicial training, and post-
appointment judicial training.   
 
The first aspect of judicial qualification is judicial education. The Judicial Authority Law 
(JAL) does not require any form of training beyond the required law degree.137 Nonetheless, 
the law grants the right to certain categories of lawyers to apply for judicial positions. In the-
ory, Article 39 stipulates a category for those claiming the right for appointment in the judi-
ciary. Potential candidates should fulfill one of the following conditions:   
1. have previous work experience as a judge or have worked in a similar po-
sition according to the law;   
2. be a senior public prosecutor;   
3. be a public prosecutor with four years’ experience;  
4. be a junior judge with the State Council, a junior lawyer at the state litiga-
tion authority, or a senior administrative prosecutor;   
5. as a lawyer, be eligible to work at the Court of Appeal for four years, and 
have a working experience of nine years; or 
6. be a law professor, having held this position for at least nine years.138  
 
In practice, however, judicial appointment in the primary courts is restricted to senior public 
prosecutors who have reached the age of 30.139 This is a tradition based on Article 49.140 
 
As for the Court of Appeal, the only way to appoint judges is by way of seniority: Judges 
must be at least 43 years old and have at least 10 years of experience working in lower 
courts.141 This discrepancy between theory and practice goes back to the authority in charge 
of appointment, –– the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). In the last 20 years, the SJC has 
never opened the door to any other category except, on two occasions, to appoint female 
judges.142 There are currently only 68 female judges.143 The SJC has neither issued a state-
                                                 
135 See Godfrey Philips, Dominions and the United Kingdom, 4 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 164, 164-65 (1932); see also 
Sally Kenney, United Kingdom’s Judicial System Undergoes Major Reform, 87 JUDICATURE 79, 81 (2003). 
136 John Dodd et. al, The Case for Judicial Appointment, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y, (2003), 
http://www.fedsoc.org/ publications/detail/the-case-for-judicial-appointments. 
137 See generally Adel Omar Sherif, Overview of the Egyptian Judicial System, and its History, 5 Y.B. ISLAMIC 
& 
MIDDLE E. L. 3, 12 (1998) (stating that a law degree is required to appoint as a prosecutor, which is the 
only practical path to be appointed as a judge).   
138 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 39 (Egypt).  
139 Joining the Public Prosecutor Bureau is usually the first step for judicial appointment. Article 38 of the JAL 
mandates only one educational requirement: a Bachelor of Laws. Judicial candidates must be: 1) an Egyptian 
national, 2) not less than 30 years old, 3) holding a Bachelor of Laws from a law school in Egypt, or a foreign 
comparable degree, 4) without a criminal or disciplinary record, even if the candidate is participating in any 
criminal rehabilitation process, and 5) be of good standing and reputation. Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Author-
ity Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 38 (Egypt). 
140 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 49 (Egypt) 
(stating that “the selection of court judges of first instance of class (B) [is] by way of promotion from 
members of the prosecution on the basis of their seniority, work and inspection reports.”).  
141 Id. at art. 116.  
142 Ahmed El Sayed, Female Judges in Egypt, 13. Y. B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 135, 135-36 (2006). 
143 Id. at 136. 
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ment prohibiting the appointment of other categories nor opened up applications to these cat-
egories.144 As a result, appointment is restricted to senior public prosecutors. 
 
The second aspect concerns pre-appointment judicial training. The National Center of Judi-
cial Studies (hereinafter NCJS) is the body responsible for providing training to judges and 
prosecutors.145 It was established in 1981.146 It is the principal institute in charge of providing 
specialized training to judges throughout their professional careers.147 It falls under the su-
pervision of the Ministry of Justice, which is the competent authority for appointing the 
NCJS director, following approval by the SJC.148 The NCJS director is also the chair of the 
its board, which consists of the director, attorney general, four judges, and four experts ap-
pointed by the Minister of Justice.149  
 
There is no formal mandate for pre-appointment training in judicial appointment.150 Law 
schools and the judiciary do not recognize judicial internships, even though the judiciary suf-
fers from financial problems and a severe shortage of judges and prosecutors.151 In practice, 
some law firms do hire law students on an informal basis to help them acquire legal exper-
tise. Law students are not authorized to formally appear in courts, even under the supervision 
of a senior attorney. The judicial systems in the United States and Germany, by contrast, are 
based on providing judicial externships to law students.152  
 
Judicial pre-training for judges differs from that for prosecutors.153 In theory, the JAL does 
not mandate any pre-academic or professional training, and judges do not require any addi-
tional training.154 The JAL implicitly requires these types of training by limiting the ap-
pointment to certain categories of lawyers. It requires training by virtue of the appointment of 
judges from diverse backgrounds. In practice, the JAL provides equal opportunity to other 
candidates –– including law professors, administrative prosecutors, and lawyers –– to ensure 
diversity in legal training.  
 
Limiting the appointment process to senior public prosecutors triggers a necessity for pre-
judicial training. Public prosecution training is limited to criminal law.155 All prosecutors in 
Egypt lack the necessary training in other legal fields –– such as civil law, commercial law, 
and labor law. The Ministry of Justice and the SJC mandate such training for new judges. 
The aim of this training is to fill the gap between theory and practice. The entire pool of can-
didates is obliged to undergo a one-month training program during their last summer at the 
Public Prosecution Bureau (PPO). 
                                                 
144 Id. at 137. 
145 Mohamed Serag, Legal Education in Egypt, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 615, 617 (2002). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Law No. 347 of 1981 (National Center for Judicial Studies Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 2 July 1981, art. 4 
(Egypt). 
149 Id. art. 3. 
150 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 116/1 (Egypt). 
151 Id. 
152 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Practical Training of Law Students, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Special-Admissions/Practical-Training-of-Law-Students 
153 See generally ALAA AL- DIN ARAFAT, THE MUBARAK LEADERSHIP AND FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT, 
232 (2009)(“stating that shortage of judges will be filled with prosecutors and government lawyers”); See gen-
erally, AL ARABIYA NEWS, Egypt to hold referendum in two stages due to shortage of judges, (Dec. 11, 2012), 
https://english.alarab iya.net/articles/2012/12/11/254547.html.  
154 Id. 
155 Mohamed Arafa, Towards a Culture for Accountability: A New Dawn for Egypt, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 1, 35-
36 (2011). 
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The absence of pre-appointment training –– such as judicial clerkships –– at law schools is 
due to law schools do not coordinate with the Ministry of Justice or private law firms to offer 
legal training to their students. 156 This approach by law firms, while seemingly inexplicable, 
may be attributed to a tradition of centralized decisions of educational policies in Egypt.157 
There are two institutions that govern the totality of the educational structure in Egypt. The 
first is the Ministry of Education, which supervises “all post-secondary education, planning, 
policy formulation, and quality control activities.”158 The second is the Supreme Council of 
Universities, which formulates “the overall policy of university education and scientific re-
search in universities, and determines the number of students to be admitted to each universi-
ty, each year.”159 As a general rule, these two entities never coordinate with the Ministry of 
Justice or the Supreme Judicial Council to offer legal education to judges. The Ministry of 
Justice and the SJC only depend on the NCJS to offer legal education to their members.  
 
The third aspect is post-judicial appointment training. The PPO believes that “the best way to 
learn how to fight is to have one.” New prosecutors start their careers without any training 
until the end of the first two years of their appointment. 160 During these years, each district 
attorney aide is assigned to a senior public prosecutor for supervision and guidance.161 The 
role of the NCJS starts at the end of the first two years of appointment, when junior prosecu-
tors undergo a three-month training period at the NCJS. Training provides major help in rec-
tifying various common mistakes that are committed during the first two years of practical 
experience.162 As far as judges are concerned, there is no requirement for formal continuing 
education, except for judges at the State Council, who are required to hold a master’s degree. 
As for professional training, the NJSC offers training courses to junior and senior judges that 
are not mandatory. Other types of training are largely unregulated and depend mainly on 
funding provided by the Ministry of Justice. 163 
 
B. The Authority of Appointment 
 
The SJC and the president share the power of appointment for new judges and prosecu-
tors. Article 44 of the JAL authorizes the president to assign judicial appointment fol-
lowing approval by the SJC.164 Nevertheless, the borderline between the authority of the 
                                                 
156 The National Center for Judicial Studies’ (“NCJS”) webpage does not include any cooperation with 
any Egyptian or foreign university. See NAT’L CENT. FOR JUDICIAL STUD., 
http://www.jp.gov.eg/ncjs/21.aspx; The only cooperation between NCJS occurs on ad-hoc basis with pri-
vate or international educational centers. For example the mutual cooperation between NCSJ and Europe-
an Union. See, EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, European Experts Share experience with the na-
tional Center for Judicial Studies and Judicial Information Center Staff on E-Learning Capacity building, 
(Feb. 8, 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8214/european-experts-share-
experiences-national-centre-judicial-studies-and-judicial-information. 
157 See generally Jamie Boex, Democratization in Egypt: The Potential Role of Decentralization, URBAN 
INSTITUTE CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT & GOVERNANCE, POLICY BRIEF, (Feb. 2011), 
https://www.urban.org/sites /default/files/publication/27151/412301-Democratization-in-Egypt-The-
Potential-Role-of-Decentralization.PDF. 
158 EDUCATION, AUDIOVISUAL AND CULTURE EXECUTIVE AGENCY, Higher Education in Egypt, (2004), 
http://eac ea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating_countries/impact/egypt.pdf. 
159 Id. 
160 Judicial Instruction Manual for Prosecutors, art.795. 
161 Id. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. 
164 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 44 (Egypt) (stating 
that “the appointment of judicial positions, either through appointment or promotion, is a matter of decision of 
the President of the Republic … after taking consulting with SJC.”  The article further stipulates “appointment 
 
19
Al Hajjaji: The Dilemma of Judicial Appointment in Egypt Questions of Gender
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2018
AL DIN AL HAJJAJI: THE DILEMMA OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT IN EGYPT 20 
president and the SJC remains unclear.165 The following paragraphs aim to illustrate the 
role of each in the appointment process. They show how the executive body enjoys some 
advantages over the SJC in the appointment process. This process can be divided into six 
stages. The first starts with the announcement of the SJC vacancy in the local media, 
which is meant to induce fresh graduates to join the public prosecution. A public call for 
candidates is published in two widely distributed national newspapers, as shown in Fig-
ure (1). The advertisement states the terms and conditions for the application. It specifies 
when application forms will be made available as well as the deadline for submitting the 
application. After submitting the application, the SJC selects candidates, who meet the 
minimum requirement, primarily a law degree with a general grade of “Good,”166 and 
sets a date for interviews.    
Figure (1): Advertisement of judicial appointment in public newspapers.167 
  
The Arab Republic of Egypt  
The Public Prosecution Bureau announces it is  
accepting applications for the vacancy of   
Aide to District Attorney  
Graduating class of 2012  
Overall grade of “Good”  
  
 Applications can be obtained between  
14/12/2013 to 24/12/2013  
The application submission period is from 1/1/2014 to 
24/1/2014  
Candidates must submit all required credentials men-
tioned on the advertisement board in the Court of Cas-
sation. If requirements are not met, applications will 
not be accepted. Applications submitted either before 
or after the deadline will not be considered.   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
of the heads of the courts of appeal, and the deputies and consultant, presidents of primary courts, judges is fi-
nalized after the approval of SJC.”). 
165 Id. 
166 The advertisement can be found on public printed newspapers. 
167. The only legal exception is in the case of appointing assistant public prosecutors. Since 2006, no one 
has been directly 
appointed to be an assistant public prosecutor. The SJC has never disclosed the reason why this employment 
method is not used. This appointment process is based on Article 116 of JAL. It states “no one can be ap-
pointed in the position of assistant public prosecutor, except the aide of district attorney, unless the candidate 
passes a comprehensive exam.” Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 
1972, art. 116 (Egypt).  
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The second stage is the exam or SJC interview stage. In theory, the JAL does not stipulate 
any entrance test requirement.168 In practice, however, the SJC schedules interviews for all 
applicants with the aim of deliberating over the candidates’ legal ability. Candidates are 
asked three criminal law questions, one of which they have to address correctly. At the con-
clusion of the interview stage, the SJC does not reveal the results to candidates; only success-
ful candidates are informed about their success. The whole process takes place over a period 
of 12 months starting from the date of the interview. The SJC sends names of potential can-
didates to the Ministry of Justice to commence the third stage.  
 
The third stage starts once the Ministry of Justice is in possession of the names of all the suc-
cessful applicants. During this stage, the Ministry of Justice carries out all the required secu-
rity and background checks. It coordinates with the Ministry of the Interior to obtain criminal 
and political record clearances, which make up the fourth stage. The JAL does not clearly 
specify which crimes have the potential to block a candidate’s appointment. In general, how-
ever, candidates should have no criminal, disciplinary, or rehabilitating records.169 Candi-
dates should be of good standing and reputation.170 The connotation of “good and bad” repu-
tation is left to the discretion of the SJC and the security agencies.171  
 
If the candidate’s record is cleared, the application goes through the second step in the back-
ground check process, which involves the candidate’s family’s criminal record. 172 In theory, 
the background check is limited to that of the candidate only. In practice, however, the SJC 
and the Ministry of Justice extend their securities check to include all the candidate’s family 
members up to the fourth degree of kinship (second cousins and their spouses).173 In their 
application, candidates are required to fill out a family-tree form. This form includes the 
names, addresses, and employment statuses of family members up to the fourth degree. It 
includes parents, grandparents, siblings, uncles, and cousins, as well as their respective 
                                                 
168 Id. 
169 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct.1972, art. 38 (Egypt) 
(states that a candidate should not have a criminal record and have a good reputation).   
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, A Call for Judicial Reform in Egypt, 11 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 257, 280 
(2017). 
173 Id. 
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spouses.174 Both the candidates and their fathers are required to submit fingerprints to verify 
their criminal history. In the event of a crime having been committed by a member of the 
candidate’s family, the SJC immediately eliminates the candidate from its pool of appoin-
tees.175 
 
The fourth stage gives the National Security Agency (NSA) the authority to investigate the 
candidates’ –– as well as their families’ –– political affiliation. The SJC and the Ministry of 
Justice practice a zero-tolerance policy regarding political history, specifically with regard to 
any affiliation with Islamist or liberal parties or groups.176 In theory, there is no direct legal 
foundation calling for candidates to be checked by the NSA; however, it has been argued that 
Article 73, regarding the prohibition of political participation of both judges and courts, also 
applies to potential members of the judiciary. In practice, the Ministry of Justice is the only 
competent authority for coordinating between the SJC and the NSA. This step is not made 
public by the SJC to the candidates. However, if a candidate chooses to challenge the re-
quirement of a security check of his relatives, he is instantly eliminated from the list of can-
didates.177 Automatic exclusion is thus applied without any justification.   
 
The fifth stage is a required medical examination involving blood and urine sampling, the 
aim of which is to ensure that candidates are free of alcohol and drug dependencies. In theo-
ry, the JAL does not mandate such a test for potential candidates.178 However, in practice, the 
SJC and the Ministry of Justice require such tests for each candidate. Even though the law 
does not stipulate such a requirement, candidates cannot refuse to take the test. Candidates 
who fail the tests are excluded from the list of candidates.179 This medical test is for first-
time appointees only; when prosecutors are promoted to judges, there is no such requirement. 
The same applies if a junior judge is promoted to work at the Court of Appeal, the Court of 
Cassation or the SCC.   
 
In stage six, a presidential appointment decree is issued for the appointment of new appoin-
tees. The JAL gives the President the ultimate authority to issue the decree of appointment of 
judges and aides to public prosecutors.181 The names of the accepted candidates are pub-
lished in “two widely distributed newspapers.”182 Moreover, candidates have to take the judi-
cial oath before the Minister of Justice. The oath reads: “I swear by the almighty God to 
judge among people with justice and respect to laws.” This oath will next be sworn when a 
senior prosecutor is promoted to judge. An oath is required only when a judge is appointed 
                                                 
174 Appendix 3 of the Public Prosecution Bureau Appointment Application contains chats of the applicant’s 
family 
members. Each candidate must complete this appendix at the best of his knowledge. It is important to know that 
such 
appendix also exists in the police and army academies to ensure that no police or army officer has any political 
affiliations. The application is not available to the public.  
175 Id. 
176 See VETO, Judicial Source: Exclusion of the Brotherhood from appointment movement in the Attorney 
General, (July 7, 2013), http://www.v etogate.com/447110. 
177 This information is required in the application for the aide to the district attorney. The application asks about 
a lot of 
information with regards to the candidate and his family’s history. It also requires disclosure of any travel or 
relation with international organizations. See Maysar Yassin, al-watan tanshor shorowt al-taqadam lewazefat 
ma’awn al-nayabah, WATEN NEWSPAPER, http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/602292.  
178 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 118 (Egypt). 
179 See Tarek Hafez, Wokala al-nayabah aljodod yodown al-kashf al-tabi we-yanhown ijrahat t’ynahom, 
MASRESS, (July 13, 2014), http://www.masress.com/elfagr/1641454.   
181 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 44 (Egypt). 
182 Id. 
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attorney general, president of the Court of Cassation, or judge at the SCC.183 In each of these 
cases, the appointee takes the oath before the president.184   
 
When prosecutors are promoted to judges at the age of 30, there is no requirement of passing 
the previously described five stages –– only stage six applies.185 The SJC forwards the names 
of the successful prosecutors to the president to issue the presidential appointment decree. 
New judges are then sworn in before the SJC. This is because the Court of Cassation is the 
competent authority for selecting and appointing new judges to the court.186 The Court of 
Cassation is the supreme court for the ordinary judiciary, except for administrative and con-
stitutional disputes. The same rule applies to the SCC.187 As far as the appointment of the 
attorney general is concerned, the SJC is the competent authority for appointment.  
 
Before 2014, the president had ultimate authority over appointing the attorney general.188 
However, the 2014 Constitution transferred this authority over to the SJC.189 After the assas-
sination of Attorney General Hesham Barakat in 2015,190 the appointment of the new attor-
ney general was delayed for more than six months.191 The reason for the delay was that the 
president wished to appoint the new attorney general, while the SJC upheld its constitutional 
right to do so itself.192 Following this struggle, the SJC successfully appointed the new attor-
ney general, Nabil Sadek. As for the judicial oath, it still has to be taken before the presi-
dent.193  
 
IV. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT 
 
A. Exclusion based on Class 
 
The first category of candidates excluded from the appointment process is candidates from 
humble backgrounds. The history of this exclusion dates a long way back––even to before 
                                                 
183 Id. at art. 71. 
184 Id. at art. 44. 
185 The 2014 Constitution considers Public Prosecution Bureau as an integral part of the judiciary. Thus, SJC 
plays a major role in the appointment of new prosecutors. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 
art.189  § 1, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that “the public prosecution is an integral part of the judiciary. It is responsible 
for investigating, pressing charges and prosecuting all criminal cases except what is exempted by law. The law 
establishes the public prosecution’s other competencies.”).  
186 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct.1972, art. 44 (Egypt). 
187 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 193 § 3, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that “the General As-
sembly chooses the Court’s President from among the most senior three vice-presidents of the court. It also 
chooses the vice-presidents and the members of its Commissioners Authority, who are appointed by a decree 
from the President of the Republic. The foregoing takes place in the manner defined by the law.”).  
188 Law No. 46 of 1972 (Judicial Authority Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 5 Oct. 1972, art. 44 and 119 
(Egypt). 
189 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 189 § 2, 14 Jan. 2014 (stating that “public prosecu-
tion is carried out by a Prosecutor General who is selected by the Supreme Judicial Council from among the 
Deputies to the President of the Court of Cassation, the Presidents of the Court of Appeals or the Assistant 
Prosecutor Generals, by virtue of a presidential decree for a period of four years, or for the period remaining 
until retirement age, whichever comes first, and only once during a judge’s career.”). 
190 BBC NEWS, Egypt Prosecutor Hisham Barakat Killed in Cairo attack, (June 29, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33308518. 
191 Mariam Jabal, Khlaf Dostori Yoajal Iktiar al-Na’b al-Am, ALBAWABA NEWS, Sept. 11, 2015, 
http://www.albawab hnews.co m/1493128. 
192 Id. 
193 AHRAM ONLINE, Nabil Sadek Sworn in by Sisi as Egypt’s New prosecutor general, (Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://english.ahram .org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/141872/Egypt/0/Nabil-Sadek-sworn-in-by-Sisi-as-Egypts-
newprosecu.aspx. 
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the beginning of the Republic era. During the monarchy, the king had ultimate authority to 
appoint judges. Article 7 of the 1947 Judicial Independence Law states that “the appointment 
of judges is carried out through a monarchical decree.”194 The 1952 coup overthrew the 
monarchy.195 It proposed that the domination of the upper class in society should come to an 
end. One of the promises of the revolution was to increase the appointment of less-privileged 
social classes within the army, the police, and the judiciary — a promise that still remains to 
be fulfilled.196  
 
The lower classes have faced great obstacles for decades. Successive regimes have covertly 
inhibited the underprivileged from obtaining equal access to public jobs, especially judicial 
appointments. Even if candidates are high-achieving students of law, they still face major 
challenges in joining the judiciary.197 In 2011, 138 candidates claimed they were rejected 
from the appointment process because their parents did not hold a university degree.198 Ex-
clusion of the underprivileged has been brought to the attention of the SJC several times. The 
issue, however, has not been overtly acknowledged or justified in any official statement.199 
 
Even though the SJC has never declared its reason for this type of elimination, the Minister 
of Justice recently set forth his position. In May 2015, the Minister of Justice, Judge Mahfouz 
Saber, was asked during a television interview whether “the son of a garbage collector stood 
any chance of appointment as a public prosecutor.”200 He replied that “the judge should be 
from a proper social class … with all due respect to garbage collectors, and to those below or 
above him … a proper environment, and a good social class is necessary … I am not saying 
he should be an aristocrat ... I am saying the class should not be very low.”201 As a result of 
this statement, Saber resigned from office a week later.   
 
The SJC did not deny the above statement.202 It is common knowledge that underprivileged 
citizens do not have an equal chance in the appointment process. Saber’s resignation was not 
the result of an untruthful statement by the Minister; rather, it was for expressing in public a 
truth that has for decades remained unspoken. Members of the lower social classes find it dif-
ficult to secure judicial or prosecution jobs.   
 
Such inequality favors judges’ sons and other relatives, who make up an undeclared quota.203 
The president of the Judges’ Club, Judge Ahmed Al-Zend, asserts that “appointing judges’ 
children will continue … there is no single force in Egypt that can stop such a practice.”204 
The  Club is the only democratic organization within the Egyptian judiciary.205 His statement 
                                                 
194 Law No. 66 of 1943 (Judicial Independence Law), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 12 July 1943, art.7 (Egypt).  
195 F.R.C. Bagley, Egypt Under Nasser, 11 INT’L J. 193, 195 (1956). 
196 TAREQ AL-BASHRI, AL-HARAKAH AL-SAYASIYAH FI MISR, 539-542 (Dar al-Shorouk 2nd ed., 2002). 
197 See Mahmoud Al-masry, Istba’ad Ta’ynat al-nayabah besabab mo’hel al-waladiyn aw al-faqr, ALBAWA 
NEWS (Dec. 19 2013) http://www.albawabhnews.com/275627.  
198 Lobna Moneib, Egyptian law graduates denounce class-based job discrimination, AHRAM ONLINE (Oct. 20, 
2014), http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/113461.aspx. 
199 Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, A Call for Judicial Reform in Egypt, 11 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 257, 280 
(2017). 
200 albayt baytak – wazear al-‘adl ya yomkan an ya’mal ibn ‘amal anzafah be-qada, YouTube, (May 10, 2015) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7H8mPdTJUWw.  
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Mohamed Al-Isamwi, al-Zend: Ta’yean abna al-Qodah sayastmeer, we lan tastati’ qah fi Misr Iqaf haza 
elzahf almoqasas, AHRAM (Sept. 3, 2012), http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/182259.aspx. 
204 Id. 
205 El-sayed Gamel el Din, Complaint against prominent judge Ahmed El-Zend referred to judicial council, 
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was considered the first official statement from an official member in the judiciary with re-
gard to this hidden quota. Prior to Al-Zend’s statement, there was a covert consensus of giv-
ing preference to children and relatives of members of the judiciary. It was not until later that 
the press tracked down the appointees and their relatives. Successive reports were published 
in the local newspaper, Al Shorouk. The first report came out in 2013,206 and revealed that 
more than 114 out of 475 appointees (24%) in the Public Prosecution Office were relatives of 
members of the judiciary.207 In 2014, this percentage increased from 25% to 35%: Out of 485 
district attorney aide appointees, 168 were relatives of judges.208 The report showed that 87 
candidates had parents working in the Court of Appeal, 11 candidates had parents working in 
the Court of Cassation, and 55 candidates had parents who were judges or prosecutors.209 
Both reports revealed the names of the candidates and their kinship to members of the judici-
ary.210  
 
B.  Exclusion based on Gender 
 
In theory, there is no legal barrier to the appointment of women as judges or prosecutors. 
Furthermore, successive judicial laws have not prohibited women from joining the bench. 
The language of the JAL is very clear in referring to candidates in a gender-neutral form. 
Moreover, advertisements for judicial vacancies never state that positions are restricted to 
male candidates.211 In practice, however, women have limited access to joining the bench as 
judges or criminal prosecutors. The question of appointing women in the judiciary was raised 
for the first time in 1951. Professor Aisha Rateb, who went on to become Egypt’s first female 
ambassador, was the first woman to apply for the position of judge on the State Council.212 
Her request was denied. She sued the State Council’s administration for denying her request. 
She fought her case all the way to the Supreme Administrative Court.213 Abdel Razzak Al-
Sanhuri, the founder of modern administrative and civil laws, also denied her appeal as 
president of the Supreme Administrative Court.214 He stated that there were no barriers 
against the appointment of women, except on administrative grounds. Hence, the decision to 
exclude the applicant was sustained as long as there was no evidence of misuse of power 
against the claimant.215 The ban on women joining the bench continued until 2007, with two 
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exceptions. First, women were allowed to join the administrative prosecution bureau, where 
they make up 25%.216 Second, Justice Tahani Al-Gebali was the first and last justice to join 
the SCC.217 In 2007, the exception extended to a new initiative to open the door for women 
to join the bench.218 This initiative was limited to female administrative prosecutors who 
wished to join the ordinary judiciary. As a result, 31 female administrative prosecutors were 
able to join the ordinary judiciary as judges.219  
 
One of the major drawbacks affecting the progress of women’s appointment in the judiciary 
was the refusal of the State Council to recognize their right to be appointed. In 2010, the 
State Council announced it would be accepting nominations of female applicants to join the 
bench. However, this decision triggered major opposition from the Public Assembly. The 
Public Assembly called for an urgent meeting to challenge the decision of the board. In the 
meantime, 24 female candidates filled out their applications. Before the closing date and dur-
ing the submission period, the State Council Public Assembly (compromising the entirety of 
the judges working at the State Council) held an urgent session to nullify the decision of the 
State Council board to appoint women. This decision led to innumerable debates surrounding 
the reasons and motives behind such a step.220 It has instigated many protests from the femi-
nist movement in Egypt, many of which have expressed concern about the future of equality 
in the country. The movement has thus far succeeded in imposing its demands.   
 
Justice Adel Farghaly, a member of the Public Assembly of the State Council, summarized 
the argument in favor of excluding women from judicial appointment. First, he distinguished 
between rights and obligations. He considered the joining of the judiciary an obligation rather 
than a right.221 He maintained that Egyptian men have obligations, such as mandatory mili-
tary service, that women are exempt from.222 He stated that the “refusal to appoint women to 
senior judicial positions has always been based on the fact that Egyptian women are not 
asked to perform military service and ‘offer sacrifice’ like men.” He went on to say that 
women occupy judicial functions in western countries because they perform military service 
and perform jobs equal to those of men, including acts of physical labor.”223 Second, judges 
and prosecutors are required to relocate to different districts every three to five years. This 
continuous relocation process would not suit the nature of women. He stated that “judicial 
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work in Egypt is not suitable for women, as they cannot balance their work and personal life 
duties. They have always been the major care providers for their families, unlike men.”224  
 
Currently, there is a constitutional mandate for the judicial appointment of women, opening 
doors for women to join the bench. Nevertheless, by late 2016, the SJC had not appointed 
any new female candidates to join the PPO or the bench.225 The 2014 Constitution leaves the 
debate to the discretion of the administration to appoint women to fill judicial vacancies. Ar-
ticle 9 eliminates any form of discrimination against women. It states that “the state ensures 
equal opportunity for all citizens without discrimination.”226 Additionally, Article 11 man-
dates that the administration appoint women in the judiciary. It explicitly states the right of 
women to secure official judiciary posts. This inhibits any argument by the administration 
that it cannot accommodate women in certain posts.227 
 
C. Exclusion based on Political Affiliation 
 
The JAL bans both courts and judges from both declaring their political opinions and partici-
pating in any political forum.228 This ban is restricted to judges and courts. Nevertheless, the 
SJC and the Ministry of Justice have extended the ban to judicial candidates. Their practice 
continues to exclude any candidates with a political affiliation. Even though political orienta-
tion is not a crime, there is a marked tendency to exclude candidates for their or their fami-
lies’ political affiliation. This tendency allows the NSA to interfere in the appointment pro-
cess, as it can exclude any candidate for these reasons.   
 
The NSA, which carries out the security check on candidates, is notorious for its ambiguity 
and lack of transparency in the background check process. It is widely known that police per-
formance is corrupt and lacks transparency.229 Moreover, candidates have no access to their 
security files and are unable to appeal their security status in the case of exclusion.230 The 
NSA does not reveal to candidates the content of their files, which are treated with a great 
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deal of confidentiality.231 There has never been a comprehensible reason why these reports 
are handled in such a manner.  
 
While having family NDP affiliations does not stop candidates from joining the bench, any 
affiliation to Islamist group –– like the Muslim Brotherhood –– is considered a political affil-
iation, resulting in instant elimination from candidacy. Currently, the ban on political partici-
pation is restricted to Islamist political affliction.232 The absence of real political parties in 
Egypt before the 2011 revolution has resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood being the only se-
rious political competitor of the National Democratic Party (NDP).233 NDP-affiliated offi-
cials banned the Muslim Brotherhood both before January 2011 and after July 2013.234 The 
dominant political parties in the country were either the NDP or the Muslim Brotherhood.235  
 
The meaning of politics in socialist and post-socialist countries is always vague.236 It is based 
on an ideology that bans the coexistence of other ideologies.237 During the socialist era, there 
was always just one political party –– first the Arab Socialist Union, established in 1962, and 
later the NDP, which was established in 1978.238 They were the major dominant parties that 
no other political party dared challenge.239 The NDP has always won the majority of seats in 
both houses. The dominant political parties in the country were either the NDP or the Muslim 
Brotherhood.240 In 1995, the NDP won 415 out of 520 seats,241 and in 2000 it won 388.242 In 
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2005, it won 311 seats, while the Muslim Brotherhood won 88 seats.243 In the 2010 elections 
–– the last before it was dissolved –– the NDP won a total of 473 seats.244 The absence of 
real political parties in Egypt before the 2011 Revolution has resulted in the Muslim Brother-
hood being the only serious political competitor of the NDP.245 The Muslim Brotherhood 
won the majority after NDP members were banned from running for election in the first 
elected parliament after the 2011 revolution. 246 
 
V. PROPOSED REFORM OF EGYPTIAN JUDICIARY 
 
This paper recommends the following three major reforms to the appointment system. First, 
the SJC must be reformed. The need for a reform of the SJC is primarily due to a lack of 
checks and balances, as shown in the comparative cases of the United States and Germany. 
Historically, the Egyptian judiciary has never accepted the interference of the president in 
choosing its members, as illustrated by the example of the dispute that arose between the SJC 
and the president surrounding the appointment of the attorney general in 2015.   
 
Moreover, the new SJC shall not include any members of the legislative authority until the 
idea of public participation is widely accepted among judges. Egypt has no independent 
House of Representatives. In the 2015 parliamentary elections, allegations emerged that the 
Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) had interfered. Hazem Abdel Azim, a for-
mer member of President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s presidential campaign, stated that the “For the 
love of Egypt” political alliance, which won all 120 closed-list seats, was established under 
the supervision of the GID and that meetings surrounding its establishment were held at GID 
headquarters.”247 As a result, any reform based on the participation of either executive or leg-
islative authority would face major resistance from the judicial community.   
 
Second, the SJC is the competent authority for appointing judges and prosecutors.248 As indi-
cated earlier, it is not democratically formulated. The appointment authority should be sepa-
rate from the SJC. The judicial appointment process should be assigned to an independent 
body that includes judges, lawyers, law professors and representatives from the public. The 
role of this body would be to separate the authority of impeachment from that of appoint-
ment. The new appointment authority would ensure equal treatment for diverse candidates 
and counter discrimination.249 As shown previously, there is a long history of discrimination 
against women and the underprivileged in particular, despite such discrimination being un-
lawful and prohibited.250 Potentially, this reform will impact and promote the inclusion of 
women, the underprivileged, and political minorities.   
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As far as gender equality is concerned, the 2014 Constitution mandates the appointment of 
women in the judiciary.251 However, in the past two years, women have not had an equal 
chance of appointment in both the ordinary and the administrative judiciary.252 The SJC con-
tinues to ban women from joining the judiciary, as it has done before with quotas for lawyers 
in appointments.253 The JAL stipulates two quotas for lawyers to be appointed as judges and 
prosecutors. Article 47 states that the yearly quota should be no less than 25% for the ap-
pointment of judges in primary courts and 10% for appointments in the Court of Appeal.254 
Article 118 states that the quota of lawyers shall be no less than 25% of the total appointees 
each year for the Prosecution Bureau.255  
 
With regard to candidates who are underprivileged and/or political minorities, the SJC would 
include members of the legal community, such as law professors and lawyers. The underpriv-
ileged and political minorities who meet the appointment requirements would obtain support 
from non-judge members of the SJC, while judges would be more objective in their rejection 
of underprivileged candidates. Both professors and lawyers would represent the conscience 
of the legal profession. Even though disagreements exist between lawyers and judges, there 
is still a great deal of mutual respect among members of the legal community in Egypt. The 
underprivileged and political minorities, along with other members of the judiciary, would 
benefit from increased diversity in the SJC.   
 
Third, there are three new judicial requirements that should be added to the current appoint-
ment requirements, namely raising education standards,256 introducing judicial internship 
programs for law graduates,257 and banning any political reports from appointment require-
ments.258 Education standards need to be improved.259 Stipulating only minimum education 
requirements leaves the door open for mediocre candidates, especially given the increasing 
number of law graduates in Egypt.260 Including higher educational standards –– such as a 
legal diploma or LLM –– can improve the appointment requirements, such as a legal diploma 
or LLM.262 This will not result in an added financial burden for candidates, as the cost of one 
diploma at Cairo University is less than $100.262  
 
As far as training prior to appointment is concerned, this must be introduced to the Egyptian 
legal system. The implementation of this system would achieve four purposes. First, it would 
provide law students with a deeper perspective on the intricacies of the court system.263 Sec-
ond, law interns would contribute to judges’ efforts in research, data collection, editing and 
writing. Third, interns would come at no additional cost to the judiciary, because they gain 
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knowledge in exchange for their services.264 And finally, at the end of their internships, in-
terns are and would be given assessment reports that could later be used as additional refer-
ences during the appointment process.265 As for the political reports requirement, banning 
such reports would end the executive authority’s influence on the nomination process. Active 
political affiliation of judicial members can be legally handled through an impeachment pro-
cess,266 while executive intervention cannot be rectified later.267  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The judiciary faces major challenges in the appointment process. Antiquated methods, which 
are no longer in practice in modern judiciaries, are still enforced. A new system needs to be 
formulated to work out the challenges and improve the development in judicial appointment. 
As far as the various requirements are concerned, two steps pave the way towards improve-
ment. One involves mandating postgraduate studies (like Germany), and the other involves 
introducing specialized judicial education (like France). These should go hand in hand, not in 
isolation of one another. The improved level of education requirements will increase the level 
of competency and collaboration among candidates.  
 
As for the appointment process, there must be transparency, justice, and equality for and be-
fore the public to ensure discrimination against women and the underprivileged is eliminated. 
This research shows implicitly that there is a gap between de facto and de jure. There is dis-
crimination against women and candidates from a lower socioeconomic status, preventing 
them from joining the judiciary. In order to illuminate this gap, my recommendations can be 
summarized in the following points. First, a new formulation of the SJC must be introduced 
to reflect a democratic and accountable judiciary to members of the general public, who are 
the source of judicial authority. The judiciary has to adopt clear methods of transparency. 
The inability to adopt such rules will continue to generate the question about the ability of the 
judiciary to face corruption, both internal and external. The SJC must include new members 
in the appointment committee to reflect the democratic process of appointment and the legit-
imacy of its members. These new members can be senior professors, who enjoy great respect 
within the judicial community. Second, the elimination of all discriminatory requirements in 
the appointment process –– such as social class, political affiliation, and gender –– is called 
for. It is no longer accepted that, while the law does not recognize any form of discrimination 
among individuals, the judiciary still continues to exercise such discrimination. Finally, it 
must raise the standard of appointment to include more educational and post-appointment 
training programs, such as internships. In the interim, the additional education requirement 
could include a postgraduate degree.  
 
This research was as attempt to explain and detail the appointment process in Egypt. It tried 
to overcome these challenges that hinder the efficiency of the Egyptian judiciary. The chal-
lenges that face a large number of law school graduates in securing judicial appointment. 
Among the most important categories that are excluded from this process are: women, the 
underprivileged, as well as those of political minority. It is largely illogical that an individual 
is excluded based on being one of these previously mentioned categories. This research has 
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offered a number of solutions, which can alleviate the severity of this exclusion. It followed 
the comparative law method to improve judicial efficiency through all possible means. 
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